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ABSTRACT
The ORS-4 Mission was the third dedicated launch for the Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) Office and first
flight of the Super Strypi launch vehicle. Chartered to develop low-cost launch capability for the Department of
Defense, the ORS-led development of the Super Strypi system was the first new launch vehicle development funded
by the US Air Force in four decades. In partnership with the University of Hawaii/Hawaii Spaceflight Laboratory
(HSFL), Sandia National Laboratories, the Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF), and the Aerojet Rocketdyne
Corporation, this development took in excess of 7 years and $60M. ORS-4 mission goals were to demonstrate the
Super Strypi system, establish baseline launch vehicle performance, demonstrate flight performance of the three new
solid rocket motors, develop and install the rail launcher, and utilize excess lift capacity for ORS test objectives and
satellite delivery to orbit. Launched on 3 November 2015 from PMRF in Kauai, Hawaii, the Super Strypi launch
vehicle was configured to achieve a 415km x 490km orbit at 94.88 degrees inclination but failed during first stage
flight. Though disappointing, there were many successes achieved by the mission and a great number of lessons
learned. Those lessons learned will be summarized in this paper.
numerous auxiliary technologies including rapid
upload, reduced operator staffing, and responsive
mission operations. The launch vehicle was designed
to leverage existing sounding rocket principles to
minimize cost and mission risk. The three-stage, solidrocket-motor Super Strypi launch vehicle contained
fixed nozzles, was spin stabilized for all three stages
and utilized limited number of parts for simplicity. The
specific motor propellant mixture for the three stages
had heritage to other launch vehicles and performance
heritage. The Concept of Operations (CONOPS)
associated with the rail launch and ground operations
were both considerably reduced compared to traditional
space launch leading to reduced operations cost.
Additionally, the launch vehicle used simplified range
safety integration by employing a first stage only flight
termination system and second and third stage
command enabled architecture that significantly
reduced the range operation costs. Command enable
means a positive command must be received by the
vehicle before stage ignition can commence. If this
signal is not received by the vehicle, it simply continues
on a ballistic path, ultimately failing to achieve orbit.

ORS-4 OVERVIEW
The previously-stated objectives were achieved through
a variety of unique approaches developed specifically
for this mission. Many of the personnel, strategies, and
protocols were carried directly into the ORS-4 mission
from the successful 2013 ORS-3 mission. Most notable
was applying the Integrated Payload Stack (IPS)
concept to integrate the 50kg-class HiakaSat primary
satellite, 12 CubeSat secondary payloads and a nonseparating tertiary payload into a single flight unit
qualified and certified for flight by the ORS Office.
ORS personnel performed all spacecraft integration at
Kirtland Air Force Base. Additionally, the ORS Office
took an aggressive position regarding system-level
mission assurance by allowing all partners to
implement internal mission assurance processes for
their respective components while the ORS Office
provided system-level oversight and management.
Technically, the design approach of the Super Strypi
launch system employed on the ORS-4 mission
demonstrated several innovative ORS technologies
including designing, building, and installing the world’s
largest rail launcher and rail launched vehicle and
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Approximately two-thirds through the first stage flight
of the mission, a catastrophic failure occurred. While
many objectives of the mission were achieved such as
rail launch and initial vehicle performance and stability,
the resulting failure did prevent full testing of vehicle
performance and validation of the spin stabilized
vehicle to orbit concept. The ORS Office completed an
anomaly investigation to attempt to determine root
cause of the failure. The lessons learned from the ORS4 mission will be documented in this paper.
DAY OF LAUNCH

Figure 2: Launch Insertion Orbit
Figure 3 shows the predicted nominal flyout ground
track and 3-sigma drop zones for the first and second
stage motors. Finally, Figure 4 shows the predicted
nominal ground track through first and second orbits.

Figure 1: ORS-4 Launch (3 Nov 15)
The Plan
Figure 1 shows the initial lift-off of the ORS-4 mission
from the Pacific Missile Launch Facility (PMRF) in
Kauai, Hawaii. Initial launch conditions based on
predicted performance of the launch motors and
guidance accuracies were targeted for a vehicle
insertion apsis of 415 km and non-insertion apsis of 490
km. As Figure 2 shows, non-insertion apsis variation
was predicted at +/- 75 km primarily driven by motor
performance variation and a guidance system designed
for maintaining vehicle attitude rather than insertion
accuracy.
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Figure 3: Predicted Launch Ground Track

2

30th Annual AIAA/USU
Conference on Small Satellites

ORS-4 LESSONS LEARNED
Since 2007, the mission of the ORS Office has been
assigned by statute to contribute to the development of
low cost, rapid reaction payloads, busses, launch, and
launch control capabilities in order to fulfill joint
military operational requirements for on demand space
support and reconstitution. Additionally, the FY 2007
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)
established policy on ORS to demonstrate, acquire, and
deploy an effective capability for operationally
responsive space to support military users and
operations from space, which shall consist of low-cost
space launch vehicles and supporting range operations
that facilitate the timely launch and on-orbit operations
of satellites. The ORS office has pursued the dual
nature of its Title 10 mission, under two broad
categories including pursuing enabling capabilities
designated as “enablers.”

Figure 4: Predicted Orbit Ground Track
The Reality:
The ORS-4 Super Strypi vehicle launched on 3 Nov 15,
separating from the rail launcher nominally at predicted
velocity and tip off rates. Initial spin up was slightly
faster than predicted for reasons yet unknown. The
vehicle flew nominally downrange through maximum
dynamic pressure and at least one significant wind
shear. At approximately 57 seconds after launch, the
vehicle broke up during first stage burn. Detailed
presentations of the accident investigation are reserved
for other forums and will not be presented in this paper.
Interested parties seeking detailed results are
encouraged to contact the Operationally Responsive
Office directly.

To implement assigned missions, the ORS Office
operates on a set of key principles that includes
implementing a mission assurance culture of tailored
management activities, applying cost constraints to
programs, adapting processes and technologies from
others over innovation, and considerable use of
collaboration with other agencies and entities. All of
these assigned objectives and key operating principles
were significant influences on the programmatic and
engineering management model that was implemented,
with varying degrees of success, on the ORS-4 mission.
Mission Assurance Processes:
Per the ORS-4 Mission Assurance Plan, signed by all
partners, the ORS Office approach relied heavily on the
expertise and experience of its partner agencies.
For this program, the ORS Office mission assurance
philosophy leverages established mission assurance
practices of our program partners as applied to their
assigned launch system elements. Specifically, the ORS
Office will assess the results of the Sandia National
Laboratory’s mission assurance processes for overall
launch vehicle mission assurance based on Sandia’s
decades of success designing, testing and launching
one-off and first time rockets. Aerojet-Rocketdyne will
apply AS/EN/JISQ9100 Rev. B and ISO 9001:2000
certified mission assurance processes to meeting ORS-4
objectives. HSFL will implement US Navy approved
processes to test and certify the rail launcher for use.
A conscious effort has been made to keep the team
small, agile and filled with program management,
engineering, mission assurance and logistics experts
with responsibility for their assigned work.

Figure 5: ORS-4 First Stage Breakup

-- ORS-4 Mission Assurance Plan
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Sandia’s launch experience base runs back to the dawn
of the space age and includes more than 50 launches,
many first-of-kind that were heavily developmental and
most were spin stabilized. Sandia’s long-standing
approach has been to tailor mission assurance processes
for each mission. Aerojet Rocketdyne is one of the
world’s premier solid and liquid rocket motor providers
and implements an ISO-9000 based quality assurance
and design assurance process on their programs. For
the rail launcher, while the development, build, and
installation was managed by the University of Hawaii,
the design was initiated by Sandia and completed by
Northrop Grumman with U.S Navy oversight, all of
which had rail launcher design and development
experience on multiple systems.

assumes some greater level of design maturity than was
reality, especially at the beginning of the mission when
deeper reviews of mission partner processes and
capabilities and technology maturity could have
identified issues sooner. Also, while the plan was to
apply targeted independent mission assurance expertise,
the ORS Office heavily relied on the use of mission
partner “Experienced” panels rather than wholly
independent reviewers. In addition, the program
office’s approach to a lean organization was heavily
reliant on partner mission assurance programs
functioning as-planned. This allowed program office
personnel to be used on multiple programs or across
disciplines reducing oversight on mission partner
efforts.

The ORS-4 Mission Assurance approach was based on
several considerations inside the ORS Office including
a primary objective to approach mission assurance as a
consumer of a commercial launch service provider in
preparation for handing off the design to future
commercial vendors, a desire to keep overall costs
lower on the program by leveraging the expertise of our
mission partners, a limitation on available funding, and
a defined goal of keeping the program office support
team very lean. Additionally, it was widely recognized
that traditional ‘big space’ mission assurance was in
direct conflict with many of the stated mission
objectives of the ORS-4 mission due to the added
expense and incompatible risk posture. This approach
to tailoring mission assurance processes for a
commercial launch was a continuation of the ORS-3
mission assurance approach. That mission successfully
delivered a complex Integrated Payload Stack off an
Orbital Science Corporation Minotaur I after leveraging
a “commercial-like” contracting and mission assurance
set of processes. However, other than the rail launcher
and Integrated Payload Stack (IPS) integration, the
ORS Office mission assurance process was
significantly constrained based on an over-reliance on
the self-directed process discipline of partners to their
mission assurance standards and a related limited use of
independent assessment of partner mission assurance
processes and implementation at the beginning of the
program.

To summarize, the ORS Office mission assurance
approach was more appropriate for a mature launch
vehicle design delivered by a launch service provider
with proven processes, more along the lines of the
ORS-3 and ORS-5 missions.
The fundamental
assumption that the ORS Office could address mission
assurance for this mission as a commercial consumer
was flawed in only one single, but significant
assumption – there is no commercial vendor for the
Super Strypi launch vehicle. Without such a basis,
there are few incentives to serve as motivation for noncommercial entities with limited experience in vehicles
of this class servicing a government customer. As
many of the ORS-4 team members were directly
involved in the successful ORS-3 Mission, some in
identical roles, it is easy to draw the conclusion not
only that the present mission assurance approach could
have been used successfully on missions like ORS-3 for
considerable cost savings to the mission, that similar
approaches should be used for missions with launch
vehicles and mission partners with such outstanding
past performance.
Lessons Learned:

Within the ORS Office, approaching mission assurance
as a commercial consumer was at least partially
incompatible for an experimental program. There was
a general belief that with government launch systems,
any independent mission assurance processes applied in
a program tend to become requirements for every
launch. With commercializing Super Strypi being a
primary objective, driving long term costs up early in
the program reduced the potential viability of the
design. However, implementation of the concept
McCraw



Apply commercial mission assurance processes to
already mature systems, not to experimental
systems.



Implement early technology and production
readiness level reviews of all program elements
using supplemental personnel.



Develop a formalized ORS Office level mission
assurance process that encompasses tailoring of
vendor processes and targeted use of independent
mission oversight appropriate to limited budget and
accelerated schedule programs.

The Sandia National Laboratories’ Mission Assurance
Program Plan (MAPP) for the ORS-4 mission outlines
4
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progressed. These two issues led to significant mission
assurance limitations and ultimately shortfalls on the
mission. For example, the Sandia program lead and
chief engineer positions were consolidated for most of
the program leading to overtasking of that individual
and reduced ability to manage the programmatics or
design efforts. In addition, many of the day to day
design decisions, especially for new mechanical and
structural components, were made by the design
engineer with limited organizational cross-checking.
This led to the waiver acceptance of design cases using
substandard margins of safety as those margins were
assumed by the mission partner during the design phase
and left the ORS Office little choice but to approve
after the fact at a review, well after the hardware had
been delivered. In addition, with a Quality Management
and Assurance process that is geared towards
documentation rather than a process control and nonconformance approval process, the program ran into
configuration control issues during the launch
campaign. In several cases at the range, physical
changes were made to the vehicle or to procedures with
limited to no quality assurance personnel involvement
in the change, many times being notified after a change
was implemented. This approach is more appropriate
for simple and repetitive sounding rockets but much
less so for developmental, first of kind, and/or complex
launch systems.

mission assurance, quality assurance and systems
engineering processes for the mission. Their processes
relied heavily on individual expertise and proficiency
with limited organizational checks and balances.
Super Strypi shall employ Mission Assurance (MA)
personnel to:
-

Support Assembly, Test, and Fielding
operations by developing and maintaining
procedures for hazardous and non-hazardous
operations.

-

Assist in the implementation of, and
conformance to, Mission Assurance objectives
as described in this Super Strypi MAPP.

-

Provide an objective witness to Flight
Assembly activities

-

Assist with Nonconformance Management
activities.

-

Assist the entire staff in meeting mission
objectives.

-

MA will be informed of activities, reserving
first right of refusal and will designate when
alternate 2-person rule coverage is
acceptable.

Lessons Learned:

--- Sandia National Laboratories Super Strypi Mission
Assurance Project Plan



While the MAPP calls for more expansive
responsibilities for mission assurance personnel,
implementation is geared toward documentation of
outcomes rather than cross-checks of actions.

Overall Mission Assurance approach should be
tailored specifically to meet the program at hand
and not simply an extrapolation of previous
missions.



Quality Assurance personnel and processes need to
be sufficiently independent and empowered to
drive behavior, not just document actions.

Sandia’s long history of launches facilitates
considerable reuse of prior designs and avionics where
applicable. Sandia assigns a program manager and
chief engineer to manage day to day activities with an
overall project lead providing strategic level guidance,
though often for the Super Strypi vehicle, the same
person was appointed to serve multiple critical roles.

Aerojet Rocketdyne implemented an internal ISO 9000
certified Quality Management System (QMS) to design,
build and test the LEONIDAS family of launch motors.
The LEONIDAS motor family was developed primarily
with company funds, though the Air Force made
significant contributions for tooling and static fire
testing. This led to an inherent conflict between the
company’s desire to deliver a capable and effective set
of motors and a corporate necessity to control
expenditures. When the motors ran into development
delays focused on the first stage composite case, the
pressure to control costs intensified. The ORS Office
mission budget was developed assuming a fully funded
company IR&D program and was never sufficient to
overcome progressively more restrictive Aerojet
Rocketdyne internal budgets. This conflict manifested
itself when limited engineering oversight and rigor led

Implementation of the MAPP was hampered by an
approach geared towards modifying a previously flown
design rather than a fresh perspective of the nearly new
Super Strypi design. In addition, while Sandia was the
designated program integrator for all elements of the
design and had worked with all the mission partners for
several years on the Super Strypi concept before the
ORS-4 mission became reality, the contractual links of
the program inhibited cross-communication between
the integration lead and sub-vendors as the design
McCraw
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Sandia was the program developer and integrator
responsible for overall program systems engineering
and design management. While Aerojet Rocketdyne
developed the LEONIDAS motors on internal funding,
delivery of the flight motors was under a contract with
the University of Hawaii administered by the US Navy.
The University was also responsible for program
management, final design, build, assembly and test of
the rail launcher leveraging multiple companies to
complete that effort. In addition, to cut program costs,
UH contracted directly several motor component
suppliers including General Dynamics for the flight
motor cases.

to the first stage being built with a significant design
escape in the first stage insulation. The issue was
compounded when resources applied to analyze the
post-static fire motor were inadequate, leading to the
team not discovering the lack of sufficient insulation in
a timely manner and the launch motor being poured
with a significant design flaw. This motor was later
deemed safe for flight with the increased risk accepted
by the ORS Office and mission partners. The insulation
design issue was not believed to be a contributing factor
to the failure.
Lessons Learned:


Clearly
define
relationships,
roles
and
responsibilities, and funding commitments and
limitations, prior to starting multi-funding source
programs.



Fund independent assessment of technology
readiness levels of all elements of a development
program, especially if inheriting architecture
components from other programs.

Program Management:
The ORS Office organizational construct for the ORS-4
mission was based on a combination of existing
relationships and contracts in place for several years
prior to the Jan ’13 start of the mission and ORS Office
principles for rapid acquisition including leveraging
mission partner internal processes for management, and
a limited budget.
Figure 6 below shows the
organizational structure for the mission.

Figure 7: ORS-4 Roles and Responsibilities
With the complexity of the organizational structure,
speed of the program, tight limitations on funding and
diverse set of contract structures, the ORS Office was
inherently, and deliberately, dependent on the business
processes of mission partners.
Inside the ORS Office, funds management was reliant
on Air Force support tools designed for slow moving
programs taking five or more years and unfazed by
funding status reports that are months behind actual
obligations and expenditures. The ORS Office came to
rely more on monthly billing receipts and real-time
inputs as needed from partners to provide timely status
of funding. Essentially, if funds tracking needs to be
within $10,000, and less than a month out of date, then
official government processes are non-responsive. In
addition, while the ORS Office maintained a program
level Integrated Master Schedule (IMS), the latency of
information supplied by mission partners and the
government accounting system ensured the schedule
was out of date as soon as it was updated.

Figure 6: ORS-4 Program Organizational Structure

ORS Office structural shortfalls were compounded by
even more limited business support tools in the mission
partners. In one case, macro-level accounting systems
at the corporate level were well defined but processes at
the program level were lacking and/or non-responsive,

Figure 7 provides an overview of roles and
responsibilities for each mission partner on the ORS-4
mission. As the initial concept developer, based on
studies and briefings dating back more than a decade,
McCraw
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inexcusable for an agency dealing with significant
program funds and critical missions. At one point, a
mission partner experienced a more than $1M overrun
that was not discovered until many months after the
fact. Despite the rather heroic efforts by the University
Program Manager, the University of Hawaii contracting
and accounting practices tended to lag several months
in awarding contract modifications and billing. Launch
range processes for accepting and obligating program
funds were better suited for standard, well defined test
programs rather than a development program. Since
every element of this mission during implementation at
the range was new, the program office found unless the
requirement was easily defined and scoped, it was
better to contract through the University.
In
summation, a development program on a short schedule
and tight budget requires timely accounting,
contracting, funding and schedule management
processes. Government and large vendor processes
proved consistently unwieldy.

Lessons Learned:


In Jan ‘13, the ORS Office Director officially approved
the ORS-4 mission to carry the Super Strypi launch
system design to first flight demonstration. By that
point, $20M of DOD funding had been spent on a
myriad of developments, studies, and analysis to mature
the launch system design. At the time of mission
approval, the ORS Office was working in a very
restricted office budget driven by several years of being
zeroed out in the President’s budget only to be restored
at non-zero levels by Congress. To meet the demands
of a tight budget the ORS Office developed an
acquisition plan that reflected a manage-to-termination
approach. Objectives for the program were prioritized
to reflect this approach with completing launch system
design at the top of the list and launch at the bottom.
This reflected the idea that the ORS Office would
develop the system as far as funding allowed, with
launch being the graduation exercise. Consistently it
fell to the ORS Office to offset any program overruns.
When combined with cost-plus contracts and an
increasingly obvious Air Force commitment to launch,
incentives within mission partners to control costs were
limited.

Lessons Learned:


For fast moving programs, establish clearly defined
contracting, invoicing and accounting practices
with mission partners that reflect the speed of the
program.



Develop alternative funds tracking processes for
government programs that are either experimental
or lasting less than 24 months.



Incentivize mission partners to maintain some
burden of accurate and timely program
management.

Lessons Learned:


Despite the best practices quality of a well-defined
Integrated Master Schedule, the ORS Office
consistently found itself tracking to inputs from mission
partners that were extensively inaccurate.
An
Integrated Master Schedule is useful when applied as a
management tool rather than a briefing item for
program reviews. For accelerated acquisitions, delays
in understanding schedule margins can cause dramatic
shifts in critical path before the change is even realized.
Unfortunately, ORS-4 mission partners either built a
schedule to fill the time allotted, built a detailed
schedule but rarely managed to it, or never built a
schedule at all.
These major differences in
development and management of the schedule caused
on-going conflicts and disconnects in the program,
especially when managing cross-organization interfaces
and resources. For development programs, schedule
management is inherently difficult. Lack of processes
in schedule management makes schedule tracking and
linking remaining work to resource requirements nearly
impossible.
McCraw

Define a program wide approach, tailored to the
speed of acquisition, for developing and
maintaining segment and architecture level
schedules including updated processes, methods
for managing critical path, and common rules for
tracking variance.

Ensure early agency-level willingness to
implement “manage-to-termination” strategies,
otherwise eliminate as an option.

A primary ORS Office objective was to create a launch
system ready for commercialization and eventually
available for sale at a competitive, and assumed lower
cost relative to other comparable launch vehicles.
Despite early attention to the commercialization
objective, it became difficult to implement as it became
obvious that the ORS Office and Sandia had completely
different ideas on the intent and method of
accomplishing commercialization. The ORS Office
believed in an approach to provide as much of the
design and development data as possible, to multiple
viable companies, and to allow the market to resolve
who would be successful.
Prior to the launch
campaign, the ORS Office solicited industry for interest
in participating in final design and readiness reviews,
and observing the launch campaign. Ultimately, five
companies/teams were selected. Separately, Sandia
developed a Cooperative Research and Development
7
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Agreement (CRADA) approach that entailed full
laboratory participation ensuring their involvement in
future launches for years. Eventually Sandia selected
one CRADA partner based on internal processes with
no inputs or involvement by the ORS Office and no
plan to allow further companies to participate.

The Nanosat Launch Adapter System (NLAS) included
the wafer, three 6U CubeSat dispensers and the
sequencer to disperse the deployment signals. The
Canisterized Satellite Dispenser (CSD) provided by
Planetary Systems Corporation (PSC) flew as a payload
as the ORS-4 mission as it was the first flight test of the
6U configuration of the dispenser. The tertiary payload
was the Autonomous Flight Safety System (AFSS),
which acquired its third qualification flight on the ORS4 mission. The primary payload was a 55-kg
microsatellite provided by the Hawaii Space Flight
Laboratory (HSFL) at the University of Hawaii. Figure
8 shows a model of the IPS.

The ORS Office and Sandia participated in several legal
reviews covering ownership and future use of the Super
Strypi design data package with both agreeing
essentially that either could use the data as each desired.
However, as Sandia cost estimates to transfer data to
the ORS Office progressively increased and delivery
timelines slipped, the ORS Office commercialization
effort died from lack of influence. With little ability to
limit funding to get to launch and no direct control over
design data, the ORS Office had no viable path to
implementing Air Force commercialization plans.
Bottom line, if funding influence is limited, data control
becomes all powerful.
Lessons Learned:


Establish clear understanding of corporate and
agency internal objectives in order to assess
realism of meeting program level objectives



Contractually define data ownership and transfer
rules at program initiation with sufficient
incentives to motivate compliance.
When
compliance isn’t achieved, follow-through as
necessary until it is.



Establish commitments to implementing defined
data ownership and transfer rules at program
initiation.
Figure 8: ORS-4 Integrated Payload Stack (IPS)

Integrated Payload Stack (IPS):
The ORS-4 Integrated Payload Stack (IPS) comprised a
single wafer filled with CubeSats, a tertiary payload on
the exterior, and a cone up to the primary payload on
the top deck (See Table 1).

During the mission design of ORS-4, the ORS team
highly leveraged the success of the IPS from the ORS-3
mission, and also reviewed the lessons learned from
previous missions to streamline the entire IPS process
and ensure the delivery of an IPS that would perform as
designed. The ORS-3 Integrated Payload Stack was a
double wafer stack of CubeSats with a Space Test
Program (STP) primary payload on top, and a few
tertiary payloads on the exterior of the stack. On 19 19
Nov 13, the ORS-3 IPS successfully deployed the
primary payload and all twenty-eight CubeSats
manifested on the stack, which established a new record
for number of satellites deployed on a single mission.

Table 1: ORS-4 Payload Manifest
Payload Name

Specification

Provider

HiakaSat

55-kg MicroSat

Hawaii Space Flight
Laboratory

Edison
Demonstration of
Smallsat
Networks (EDSN)

8x1.5U CubeSats

NASA Ames

Argus

1x2U CubeSat

Saint Louis and
Vanderbilt
Universities

PrintSat

1x1U CubeSat

Montana State
University

McCraw

Similar to the mission assurance approach across the
mission partners, the mission assurance of the IPS was
performed by relying on internal standards and
procedures. The IPS management on ORS-4 was
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requirements, integration readiness and schedule to
completion, approved waivers to requirements, and
their contingency battery charge plan. This process
gave the office confidence that each payload was ready
to be integrated into the stack and had all of the
appropriate levels of certification and licensing in place.

performed by two team members from the ORS Office,
and the integration support was provided by a small
team of Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL)
personnel. From a physical perspective, the IPS and
upper stage of the launch vehicle were mechanically
and electrically fit checked together on multiple
occasions prior to integration at the launch site (See
Figure 9: IPS Mechanical and Electrical Fit Check).
Additionally, all of the payloads and IPS hardware were
mechanically and electrically fit checked throughout the
program prior to integration at Kirtland Air Force Base
(KAFB). The documentation for the IPS consisted of
nine Interface Control Documents (ICDs) to control
every mechanical and electrical interface contained on
the IPS, twenty-two integration/ test plans and
procedures, over thirty document submittals from the
payload teams detailing their mass, inhibits, hazards,
ground operation requirements, etc., and review
packages for both the Payload Readiness Review (PRR)
and Pre-Ship Review (PSR) that were held for each
payload.

Integration of the IPS was performed at the AFRL/ORS
processing facility at KAFB. After the ORS-4 IPS was
integrated, stack level tests were performed including
mass properties (mass, Center of Gravity (CG),
Moment-of-Inertia (MOI)). The measured mass was
within 0.09-kg of analysis, the measured CG was within
5-mm of analysis, and the measured MOIs were within
1.2% of analysis. These levels of accuracy are a
reflection of the success of the mission assurance
approach as performed by the IPS team. Following the
system level tests, the IPS was packaged in its shipping
container and was transported with the mission GSE on
a USAF C-17 to Kauai, HI. Upon arrival at PMRF in
Kauai, the IPS and GSE were unloaded into a
processing facility at Kauai Test Facility (KTF) located
on PMRF. The IPS integration team built and stood up
a clean tent in one day and moved the IPS into the clean
room for the limited range processing planned for the
IPS (See Figure 10).

Figure 9: IPS Mechanical and Electrical Fit Check
The PSR package required the payload teams to provide
the following artifacts: Certificate of Flight Readiness
(CoFR), ICD Requirement Verification Traceability
Matrix (RVTM) completion of requirements and
artifacts to prove all requirements were met, frequency
approval license, non-conformance reports (NCRs),
resolution of anomalies, information assurance
McCraw

Figure 10: IPS During Range Processing
After initial processing, the IPS was transported to the
vehicle assembly building for integration with the upper
stage of the launch vehicle. All processing and
integration preparation was completed by the ORS
payload team. As with the ORS-3 mission, the payload
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was then completed by Northrop Grumman under
management by the Navy and the University of Hawaii.
Figure 10 is a photograph of the ORS-4 rail launcher
installed at PMRF.

team turned over responsibility for final integration to
the launch vehicle integrator, Sandia in this case, when
the IPS was within one inch of mating to the upper
stage. Figure 11 shows the IPS after final mating to the
first stage rocket motor.

Figure 12: ORS-4 Rail Launcher (PMRF)
As with many components of the ORS-4 mission, the
launcher used was a scaled up version of several
previous versions (see design specifications in Table 2).
The primary design guidance that Northrop Grumman
ultimately used for the design and fabrication of the
Super Strypi rail launcher was EWR 127-1/MILHDBK-1038, which is the appropriate governing
document for rail launch systems in the US and was
designed to a yield factor of safety of 3.0 for all rated
loads.

Figure 11: IPS Mounted To First Stage Motor
Another key achievement proven on this mission was a
payload swap shortly before integration of the IPS.
After the program encountered the third significant slip
due to the first stage motor issues, one of the payloads
had to pull out of the manifest due to funding
constraints. Subsequently, the ORS Office engaged the
industry for a suitable 6U satellite for replacement on
the manifest, identifying the Beta payload from the
Pumpkin team as a suitable option. The ORS Office
was able to evolve the mission design and document
exchange phase to ensure interface compatibility with
the IPS, which did require only one hardware change
from a Rev-A CSD to a Rev-B CSD. This manifest
change was performed just three months prior to
payload integration at KAFB, which illustrates the
power of modular and standardized satellite design.
Additionally, the Pumpkin team was able to reconfigure
their entire spacecraft in this timeframe and was able to
obtain their operational frequency license by the
required integration date.

Table 2: ORS-4 Rail Launcher Specifications

Although the IPS was a secondary objective on the
ORS-4 mission, the systems engineering architecture
and mission assurance process was validated by
employing a compact team and a streamlined approach
with the physical and documented interface control.

Specification

Verified

Launcher
Capacity

63,000 lbs Launch
Vehicle

Test

Launcher
Elevation Range

0-80 degrees

Demonstration

Launcher
Azimuth Range

171.4 – 206.9 degrees

Demonstration

AZ Speed

5 deg/min

Demonstration

EL Speed

4.5 deg/min

Demonstration

Tip-Off Rate

0.50 deg/sec

Analysis

Pointing Stability

+/- 0.1 degrees

Test

Pointing
Accuracy

+/- 0.05 degrees

Test

Though far too extensive to recite in this summary of
lessons learned, the rail launcher and applicable
operational protocols were tested extensively, and
multiple times, during the certification of the launch
system. Many of the processes for designing, aligning
(See Figure 13), load testing (See Figure 14), and
certifying the rail launcher were heavily tailored to
meet the size for this rail, often with creative
application of new tools and assemblies.

Rail Launcher:
As previously mentioned in this paper, Sandia applied
considerable heritage with the design, fabrication,
installation, and operation of many rail launch systems
to develop the initial rail launcher design. This design
McCraw
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Figure 14: Rail Launcher Load Testing
Perhaps the largest single challenge with the installation
and operation of the rail launcher was rooted in
ownership. While it was developed specifically for the
ORS-4 mission and funded entirely by the ORS Office,
the requirement to certify a rail safe for flight ultimately
resides with the range in which the rail inhabits. The
fact that Sandia designed the rail, Northrop Grumman
fabricated it, and HSFL installed and operated it under
final certification from PMRF, often generated
conflicting or unclear requirements and excessive
verification and testing as each independent
organization generated requirements to be satisfied.
Figure 13: Rail Launcher Alignment Testing

There were obviously multiple lessons learned during
the operation of the first rail launched orbital vehicle
that would be mitigated simply through exercising of
additional missions. One such lesson was the simple
matter of mating the fully-assembled launch vehicle to
the static, horizontal rail. Though ultimately successful
due largely to heroic efforts of a few key logistics
personnel, the fully assembled Super Strypi launch
vehicle was on the very edge of capability for standard
USAF load handling practices. The relatively confined
area between the vehicle and the rail, once successfully
loaded, made any on-pad modifications or inspections
sometimes challenging. Some consideration should be
given to loading the vehicle to the rail in sections for
future missions; though this observation will not come
without additional challenges – namely, precision work
required for final mating of sensitive hardware.
Additionally, routine features like wind weighting,
pointing, and lock-out protocols will become much
more refined through the exercise of more launches.

During the testing leading up to and operation of the
rail launcher during the launch of the ORS-4 mission,
the rail launcher exceeded expectations. The hydraulic
control system designed specifically for this system not
only performed flawlessly, but was also found to be
robust, precise, and deliberate in almost all of its
required operations when exercised, both unloaded and
loaded, vertical and horizontal. While there were
multiple lessons learned associated with the rail
launcher, the majority of them involved CONOPS,
ownership, and maintenance. It is widely accepted by
all parties involved that the Super Strypi vehicle
separated exceptionally cleanly from the rail during the
ORS-4 launch with no violations of pointing and tip-off
requirements.

Lastly, it should be noted that while there are multiple
advantages of a rail launched configuration, it is
difficult to conclude that such a system will be as cost
effective or simple to maintain compared to a concrete
pad and launch stool without considerably more
launches. A rail launched system and associated active
McCraw
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whether the hydraulic controls on the loader had
sufficient sensitivity to complete the launch vehicle
upload within the tight tolerances required. Figure 16
shows an initial test with a Tunner Loader carrying a
maximum rated capacity of 60,000 pounds while the
Air Force operator attempts to accurately lift the loader
bed to a specific location. In this case, the operator was
attempting to place the tennis ball in the red solo cup,
colloquially called the 60K Challenge.
The
combination of a skilled operator team and the Tunner
Loader maneuverability provided sufficient confidence
to continue planning upload using the loader.

control is simply a more complex mechanism that must
survive in a harsh environment all the days not in use.
The post launch refit of the rail launch site was
however, limited to replacing some blast plates,
ablative material and general pad cleanup.
No
significant damage was done to the rail launcher during
the ORS-4 launch.
Lessons Learned:


It is possible, though not proven, to launch vehicles
as large as Super Strypi using rail launch
technologies, though the ultimate insertion
accuracy of the mission was not verified.



Range should take an active lead in certification of
rail launcher.



Refined CONOPS would enhance the benefits of a
rail launched mission.



Large numbers of launches are required to justify
additional installation and operational expense of a
rail launcher.

The Air Force Tunner 60K loader performed as needed
during transport and loading of the first stage motor on
military aircraft (see Figure 15).
Figure 16: Hydraulics Controls Testing
The rail launcher base modification and rail launcher
boom manufacture were completed in New Mexico.
The full rail launcher was assembled in Albuquerque as
a dry run before shipping to Kauai. The team took the
opportunity to complete a pathfinder upload using a full
volume, 16,000 pound, simulated launch vehicle
(FeBird) to test out upload procedures prior to launch
deployment (Figure 17). While the FeBird was only
25% of full mass, the pathfinder provided a highly
useful test of maneuvering the vehicle into position for
upload on the launch rails.

Figure 15: LEO-46 Loading on USAF C-17
The Tunner Loader is rated to 60,000 pounds. For the
ORS-4 mission, the full launch vehicle loaded on the
carriage assembly weighed approximately 72,000
pounds requiring a one-time use waiver from the Air
Force.

Figure 17: ORS-4 Pathfinder in Albuquerque, NM

The process for developing the waiver package and
coordinating through Air Force channels took several
months. In the meantime, the program developed
several work around pathfinder tests to determine
McCraw

The combination of the 60K Challenge at 87% full
mass and the FeBird Pathfinder at full volume but 25%
mass provided strong confidence prior to deployment
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Low parts count was a design feature of the Super
Strypi system, and is a relative term, but currently the
Super Strypi design is unproven given the obvious
problem with spinning the first stage motor and lack of
flight data beyond 57 seconds. Spin stabilization
allows for potential future removal of the first stage
flight termination system, a simplified attitude control
system on the second and third stages, and use of the
rail launcher. If spin stabilization is rejected as an
option, the design will have to become more complex.
In addition, the simplified ACS brings an inherent
increase in drop zone size for the first and second stages
and reducing available orbit inclination options. It also
results in large insertion error bands, +/- 75 kilometers
3 sigma for the ORS-4 mission.

that the 60K loader, upload team, and upload
procedures would allow upload of the launch vehicle at
the range. This proved to be a reasonably accurate
assessment though the extra 12,000 pounds of the live
vehicle on the carriage assembly changed the dynamics
of the Tunner Loader hydraulics controls just enough to
significantly slow down the upload by several hours at
the range (Figure 18) from the Pathfinder.

Conclusions:
Ultimately, the primary objective of the ORS-4 mission
was to validate the Super Strypi launch system concept
of a rail launched, spin stabilized through the
atmosphere, low parts count, launch vehicle. As with
many development programs, the overall mission was a
partial success. The ORS-4 Mission utilizing the Super
Strypi launch vehicle was launched with a full
complement of payloads, an accomplishment that many
developmental launch vehicles never reach and should
be considered a successful feat in and of itself.
Terminal failure during the first stage burn prevented
the satellites from being placed in orbit or from the full
evaluation of the launch vehicle performance, including
the validity of the command enable system for flight
termination and orbital insertion accuracy.

Figure 18: Tunner 60K Loader During Upload
Borrowing, delivering, supporting, and retrograding the
loader required considerable support hours from the
ORS Office. The loader can currently only be road
shipped or transported by military aircraft. On-going
use of the 60K loader is unsustainable.
Lesson Learned:


Perform a full scale, full weight Pathfinder for all
modes of transportation, handling and upload.



Replace the USAF Tunner 60K loader with a
dedicated and simplified assembly, transport and
upload platform. A trailer-derived system that is
road mobile behind a standard tractor trailer seems
more cost effective.

The ORS Office and the US Air Force have completed
a detailed anomaly investigation and only a portion of
those results are included in this summary due to outof-phase approval cycles and limitations of space.
There were many non-technical lessons learned that are
documented in this summary that should be considered
for future missions involving the Super Strypi launch
vehicle itself or large development programs in general.
The most likely cause of the launch vehicle anomaly
was breach of the first stage motor case due to slag
build up in the aft end of the first stage motor from
vehicle rotation leading to increased insulation erosion.

Miscellaneous:
Spin stabilization worked as designed from initial rail
launcher separation through maximum dynamic
pressure and at least one significant wind shear. Roll
rate was nominal through the first 47 seconds, except
for initial spin-up nearly twice as fast as expected
through the first 10 seconds of flight then returned to as
predicted. However, spin stabilization also doomed the
mission as the first stage motor proved insufficiently
robust. In summary, use of spin stabilization in the
Super Strypi design is unproven and ability to
successfully implement on future launches is beyond
current analysis capabilities. Any future launches will
require a design change to the first stage motor and
possibly to second and third stage motors.

McCraw

There were, however, many successful lessons learned
that provide encouragement for continued pursuit of
low-cost launch vehicles. The reduced manpower and
CONOPS involved for a rail launch system does
directly result in cost savings and reduced range
operations. Additionally, the concept of an IPS that
integrates multiple payloads together to be delivered to
the launch vehicle as a single unit is a powerful concept
that was proven again successful on the ORS-4 mission.
13

30th Annual AIAA/USU
Conference on Small Satellites

